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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. The trial court never ordered W. Kelly Ryan ("Ryan") to appear at trial 
personally. (R. in toto) 
2. The trial court never ordered Ryan to refrain from being represented by 
counsel. (R. in toto) 
3. In fact, in setting the final trial date, the trial court encouraged Ryan to 
obtain counsel for trial. (R. 2922 - 5:24-25; 6:1.) 
ARGUMENT 
Each of the claims asserted by Appellees (hereafter collectively referenced as 
"Rodaric") in Appellee's Brief lacks merit. Accordingly, this Court should overturn the 
trial court's default judgment entered against Ryan and order that the trial court enter 
judgment in Ryan's favor. 
The central question presented to this Court is whether Ryan "failed to appear" for 
trial on November 9, 2010, thereby providing adequate basis for the entry of default 
against him. However, it is without question that Ryan did appear via counsel, ready to 
proceed with trial. A party may appear via counsel in a civil matter, especially where the 
trial court has not ordered otherwise. Accordingly, Ryan had a right to appear via 
counsel, and Ryan must prevail in this appeal. 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S ENTRY OF 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT BECAUSE, CONTRARY TO RODARIC'S 
ASSERTIONS, RYAN PROPERLY PRESERVED ALL ARGUMENTS 
BELOW. 
Ryan's arguments that there was no justification for the entry of default, in law or 
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in fact, were properly preserved in the court below. Rodaric properly sets forth the 
standard for preserving an issue in the court below. See Appellees' Brief at pp. 7-8 (citing 
Badger v. Brooklyn Canal Co., 966 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1998)("In a trial setting, to 
preserve an issue for appellate review, a party must first raise the issue in the trial court. 
That is, a trial court must be offered an opportunity to rule on an issue.")). The trial court 
entered Ryan's default solely because Ryan supposedly "failed to appear." (R. 2771-73.) 
Concerning proper preservation of issues, the question before this Court therefore 
is whether the trial court had an opportunity to rule that there was no basis, in law or in 
fact, to enter the default judgment against Ryan. The answer to this question is a 
resounding "Yes." The trial court did have an opportunity to rule that there was no basis 
for an entry of default for failure to appear. 
First, the best way to preserve an issue concerning the entry of default for failure 
to appear is to actually appear. In the instant matter, Ryan's attorney requested that he be 
allowed to appear in Ryan's behalf and that he was prepared to proceed to trial. The 
Court accepted this appearance in Ryan's behalf before entering any default. There is no 
question that the trial court had an opportunity to allow the trial to proceed after Ryan's 
counsel appeared in his behalf. There is no question that the trial court had an opportunity 
to decide that an appearance via counsel was sufficient in a civil matter where no prior 
order stated otherwise. 
Second, after the trial court accepted the appearance of Ryan's attorney but still 
entered judgment by default, Ryan's counsel repeatedly stated to the trial court that there 
was no basis for the entry of default and requested that the trial court reference the 
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particular rule that supported the trial court's actions in an obvious attempt to preserve 
this specific issue for appeal. (R. 2922 - 13-19.) The trial court stated that there was 
sufficient justification set forth in the default documents, even stating that there was 
clearly sufficient preservation of such issues for an appeal, and clearly suggesting that the 
trial court would not consider the matter further. (R. 2922 - 18:20-21.) 
Accordingly, Ryan provided the trial court with every opportunity to find that his 
appearance via counsel was sufficient to overcome any entry of default. Ryan also 
provided the trial court with an opportunity to review the legal basis for the entry of 
default. The trial court then ruled upon Ryan's concerns, stating that despite Ryan's 
appearance via counsel and despite Ryan's expressions that no rule supported the entry of 
default, there was support for the entry of default. Again, the trial court itself expressed 
that Ryan had sufficiently presented his concerns to the trial court and properly preserved 
such issues for appeal.1 
II. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
BECAUSE NO RULE OR STATUTE SUPPORTS THE TRIAL COURT'S 
DECISION. 
A. Rodaric concedes that Rule 55 does not support the trial court's decision. 
In their brief, Rodaric admits that "Utah R. Civ. P. 55, has no bearing on the 
judgment entered by the district court." Appellees' Brief at p. 8. Accordingly, the parties 
are in agreement that Rule 55 does not support the trial court's entry of judgment against 
Ryan realizes that this Court, not the trial court, is the proper entity to determine the 
sufficiency of the preservation of issues. However, Ryan references the trial court's 
statements merely to indicate that the trial court did feel it was informed of Ryan's 
concerns and that such issues were ruled upon by the trial court when it refused to allow 
the matter to proceed to trial and when it refused to amend or alter the default judgment. 
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Ryan. 
B. Rodaric's argument that Rule 16 applies is without merit. 
After admitting that Rule 55 does not apply, Rodaric erroneously proceeds to 
assert that Rule 16 applies. Although Rodaric accurately recites the content of Rule 16(d) 
in effect at that time, Rodaric fails to properly apply it to the instant matter. The only 
portion of Rule 16(d) that could possibly apply states that, "[i]f a party or a party's 
attorney fails to obey a scheduling or pretrial order . . . the court, upon motion or on its 
own initiative, may take any action authorized by Rule 37(b)(2).,"2 
Rodaric states that Rule 16 applies because Ryan failed to comply with an order of 
the trial court, thereby justifying the trial court's entry of default pursuant to Rule 
37(b)(2). Specifically, Rodaric claims Rule 16(d) applies because of "the [trial court's] 
order and admonishments that [Ryan] appear in person . . . [and because] Ryan was 
admonished by the court to appear in person and be ready for trial and he failed to do so." 
Appellees' Brief at p. 10. However, such assertion is a misleading half-truth that lacks 
merit. 
As stated above, Rodaric's claim that, "Ryan was admonished by the court to 
appear in person and be ready for trial" is partially true, but, as a whole, it is patently 
false. It is true that the trial court instructed Ryan to "be ready for trial," but it is untrue 
that "Ryan was admonished by the court to appear in person." In the Argument section of 
Rodaric's brief, where Rodaric actually makes these deceptive assertions, Rodaric does 
2
 The remaining language of Rule 16(d) does not apply because such language relates 
only to participation in scheduling or pretrial conferences, not to trial. 
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not cite to any part of the record to support their misleading claim that "Ryan was 
admonished to appear in person and be ready for trial." This is telling, because Rodaric 
cannot point to any language anywhere in the entire record where Ryan was ordered to 
"appear in person" for trial. 
In Rodaric's entire brief, the closest Rodaric comes to referencing support for the 
deceptive claim is in the Statement of the Case section. In paragraph 4 of Rodaric's 
Statement of the Case, Rodaric provides a more truthful account of the trial court's 
instruction to Ryan. Specifically, in paragraph 4, Rodaric states that, "[t]he district court 
made clear to Ryan and another pro se party that they needed to be prepared and ready 
for trial on the dates set." Ordering a party to be prepared and ready for trial is a far cry 
from representing that the same party was "admonished by the court to appear in person." 
The actual language from the record relied upon by Rodaric is found on page 32 of 
the hearing held on August 2, 2010, wherein the trial court asked two pro se parties if 
they would be ready for the new date set for trial. After receiving an answer in the 
affirmative, the trial court then stated to all the parties concerning the new date set for 
trial: "Everyone will be prepared and ready to go." Nowhere was Ryan ordered to 
appear personally. Ryan complied with the Court's instruction by seeking to settle the 
matter on November 8, and then, when a settlement agreement was not reached, Ryan 
3
 It was actually Rodaric's counsel who stated to the Court that there was a likely 
settlement with all parties, including Ryan, and then proceeded to request that nothing be 
done on November 8, 2010. Specifically, counsel for Rodaric stated to the trial court that, 
"If we spend this afternoon and tomorrow morning on it, we think we can get this done. 
If for some reason it falls apart, I mean we'll know by 11 or so in the morning and just be 
here and have to be ready to do to trial, which is what we were today, if that works with 
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then appeared via counsel, "prepared and ready to go."(See (R. 2922 - 3:17-25; 4:1-5; 
9:4-7,25; 10:1-8.)) 
Again, Rule 16(d) only applies where a party has failed to obey a particular order 
of the trial court. Here, the trial court ordered Ryan that he "be prepared and ready to go" 
when it was time for trial. Ryan, and all other parties - plaintiffs and defendants alike, 
agreed to not begin trial on November 8, due to settlement discussions. When settlement 
was no longer viable for Ryan, he appeared via counsel on November 9, prepared and 
ready to go, in direct compliance with the trial court's instruction. 
Accordingly, as discussed above, Rule 16(d) does not provide any basis for the 
trial court's ruling. 
C. Rodaric's argument that Utah Code § 78A-2-201 applies is equally without 
merit. 
Searching for any justification for the default entered by the trial court, Rodaric 
hopefully references Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-201, claiming that such section supports 
the trial court's entry of default judgment. Specifically, Rodaric states that Utah Code § 
78A-2-201 allows a trial court to strike pleadings and enter default because a district 
court has "the inherent powers to 'enforce order in the proceedings before it', to 'compel 
obedience', and to 'control...persons in any manner connected with a judicial 
proceeding.'" Appellees' Brief at p. 10. Subsection 201 grants a trial court the authority 
to enforce its orders and to ensure that proceedings before it are orderly. Subsection 201 
does not grant any court the authority to enter any order it so desires. At best, subsection 
the Court." (R. 2921 - 2:16-20.) 
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201 granted the trial court the authority to order Ryan to be personally and physically 
present for trial - authority that the trial court did not elect to use. Subsection 2Q1 does 
not provide justification for striking pleadings and entering default where no order has 
been violated and where a party is present via counsel, prepared and ready for trial. 
Accordingly, Rodaric's novel interpretation of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-2-201 is 
without merit. 
III. THIS COURT SHOULD OVERTURN THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION 
BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE MATTER 
TO GET TO TRIAL, 
In addition to requesting that the Court overturn the trial court's entry of default 
judgment against Ryan, Ryan also requests that the Court also enter judgment in Ryan's 
favor based upon the fact that, as a matter of law, Ryan's defenses are such that the trial 
court erred in even letting the matter reach trial. 
Rodaric objects to Ryan's claim by stating that Ryan's arguments were never 
raised before the trial court. However, each and every legal issue addressed by Ryan was 
raised in various motions and other filings, including a motion for summary judgment 
and supporting memoranda filed with the trial court, in addition to the specific issues 
raised before the trial court on November 9, 2011. (R. 2922 - 10-19; R. 1821-1945, 1979-
2121, 2142-73, 2202-09, 2601-23, 2657-62, 2683-2734.) 
Accordingly, this Court may properly consider the lower court's decision 
regarding such legal issues because if the trial court erred in refusing summary judgment 
or if there is no legal grounds under which Rodaric could have recovered, the matter 
should have never even proceeded to trial and judgment in Rodaric's favor is improper 
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nd unlawful 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should overturn the trial court's default 
idgment against a party who was present and ready to proceed with trial. This Court 
hould also issue an order granting judgment on behalf of Ryan. 
iL 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this J&_ day of November, 2011 
AVERY BURDSAL & FALE, PC 
U. Fale 
Ulneyfor Appellees 
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